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CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND ITS 
UTILIZATION OF MONETARY CONTROL MECHANISMS
The Federal Reserve System was created under the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913 to execute monetary policy. Monetary policy 
’attempts to provide the public with the cash balances and bank 
credit necessary to sustain growth in output at high levels 
of employment and to maintain a stable purchasing power for the 
dollar."^The Federal Reserve Board, in its execution of mon­
etary policy, utilizes various mechanisms in affecting money, 
with the use of the discount rate as a regulator of the cost 
and availability of funds or credit. The Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, the Federal Open Market Committee, and 
the officers df the 12 Federal Reserve Banks all share the 
authority for making monetary policy. Essentially, they decide 
the degree of restraitt or encouragement to be imposed on bank 
credit expansion. In attempting to reach policy goals, the 
Federal Reserve System (hereafter referred to as the Fed) takes 
action through its open market operations, discount rate, and 
reserve requirement adjustment power. These mechanisms have a 
decisive impact on the availability and cost of bank reserves.
As such, interest rates and conditions of credit, availability 
of bank credit» and the supply of money are directly affected
Jack Guttentag, ’Credit, Availability, Interest Rates, 
and Monetary Policy, Southern Economic Journal. XXVI 
(January, I960), p. 219.
2
by Federal Reserve Monetary Policy,
Prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, 
the Fed*8 monetary policy was unstable, lacked flexibility, and 
rather chaotic. Before World War I, the Fed was mostly engaged 
in developing its organization, having no acute problems to 
meet. During the war, the Fed assisted in financing it by 
establishing a preferential rate on paper secured by govern­
ment obligations when it was discounted by member banks with 
the Federal Reserve Banks. The rate was fixed at a level which 
made it possible for member banks to finance public purchases 
of government securities on an installment basis. The rate 
paid to member banks by purchasers of these securities was the 
coupon rate on the bonds. The banks, then, discounted the 
paper with the Fed banks at a slightly lower rate. The end 
result was large expansion of member bank and Fed bank credit. 
This large supply of money along with a short supply of consumer 
goods caused the Fed to raise the discount rate to 7% by the 
spring of 1920. The resulting collapse was attributed to the 
Fed along with the previous inflation, but a Congressional 
investigating committee cleared the Fed on these counts.^
From 1922 to World War II, Federal Reserve monetary policy 
varied considerably.^Stability of monetary policy during the 
1922-1929 period aided in giving the United States prosperity.
p
E. A. G-oldenweiser, American Monetary Policy. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1951), PP. 131-137.
3Ibid., pp. 138-182.
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During this time, a national credit policy was established and 
the right of the Fed to change the discount rate was asserted. 
Prior to the panic of 1929, Fed actions were useless in combat­
ting the speculatory movement unless money was shut off to the 
stock market operations, which was beyond the Fed's control. 
However, the Board turned down continual demands for increases 
in the discount rate asserting that the speculation movement 
wasn't any of their business. From 1929 to 1950, the Fed em­
barked on a policy of easy money, with v&Mations. Federal 
Reserve monetary policy during the depression did as much to 
help combat it as it could considering the situation was world­
wide. From 1929-1933, easy monetary policy consisting of re­
duced discount rates and failure to pursue a vigorous open- 
raarket policy were evident. During 1933-1935, the Fed pursued 
additional monetary and credit ease,consisting of discount 
rate reductions and open market operations. During 1936-1938, 
the Fed resorted to increases in reserve requirements to cover 
up the #10 billion in excess reserves in 1936. Although the 
decline of 1937 wasn't directly attributed to these reserve 
adjustments, it showed the Fed what a powerful weapon they had. 
During World War II, the Fed was committed to provide the 
Government with low-cost funds. The war was subsequently 
financed by enough Federal Reserve credit to enable the Govern­
ment to borrow more than #200 billion. The Fed stood ready 
to buy U. S. Government securities at or above par— at a 2 1/2^ 
interest rate on long-term bonds and lower rates on short-term
4
issues. This meant that these securities held by member 
banks were as liquid as cash reserves, since they could be 
converted to cash at or above par at any time.^As such. Fed­
eral Reserve control mechanisms and their usefulness as anti- 
inflationary measures were obliterated,»
The use of monetary control mechanisms as an integral 
part of monetary policy was diminished through ^pegging" 
Government securities. As Marriner Eccles, then Chairman of 
the Board of Governors, told Congress in 1947, "Control of 
interest rates on Government securities...is not an effective 
instrument for achieving monetary objectives."^This statement 
reflected the inappropriateness of supporting Government 
securities during the post-war period, which, in turn, pro­
duced a skepticism about the purpose of monetary policies.
This skepticism was reinforced by the realts of several surveys 
conducted during the late 1930*s which suggested that business­
men were little affected by interest rates.^ The imposed stab­
ility of interest rates by the Fed was believed to continue 
into the post-war years. However, those who considered the 
possibility of releasing the Fed from its wartime committment 
to stabilize Treasury security prices and yields rejected this 
alternative due to a fear that fluctuations in interest rates
^Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLI (January, 1948), p. 16.
5lbid.
^J. P. Ebersole, "The Influence of Interest Rates Upon 
Entrepreneurial Decisions in Business," Harvard Business 
Review. XLII (Autumn, 1938), pp. 35-40.
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and security prices might adversely affect the willingness 
of investors to continue to hold the swollen public debt.
And, interest in monetary policy was shifted to a new weapon, 
fiscal policy, which seemed to promise all the economic 
control needed.
The realities of the post-war world led to recognition 
that skepticism about the usefulness of flexible monetary pol­
icies had been exaggerated and that an inflexible monetary 
policy involved difficulties. This recognition was brought 
about, primarily, by three influences: (1) The major post­
war problem turned out to be inflation rather than deflation,
(2) Fiscal policy couldn*t be relied on solely to cure econ­
omic ills, and (3) Inflexible monetary policy, i,e, holding 
interest rates stable, proved to involve far more difficulties 
than had been anticipated.
Since inflation rather than deflation was a major post­
war problem, interest in monetary policy revived due to 
two reasons. First, much of the skepticism about monetary 
policy's usefulness had been based on the assumption that 
monetary policy is ineffective in dealing with depressions. 
However, the post-war inflation proved this irrelevent.
Secondly, inflation was widely believed to be a monetary 
phenomenon and its occurance induced a search for monetary cures.
Gradual disappointment of fiscal policy also helped revive 
the idea that monetary policy might be effective. Fiscal 
policy had caught the imagination of economists after
6
John M. Keynes Introduced his theories.? Keynes put the major 
emphasis on the possibilities for government to Influence the 
economy through direct Investment and taxation. Government, 
he argued, could Inject or withdraw Income from the economy 
whlc^ would have a multiplied effect on Income because people 
ordinarily spend the greater part of additions to Income and 
save only a fraction. Public Investment could be varied. If 
necessary, to stimulate total income by a multiple of Itself. 
Taxation could have the same effects In the opposite direction 
as could reduced public Investment. The leverage or multiplier 
of a given amount of Investment or taxation would depend upon 
the consumer’s marginal propensity to consume. However, the 
consumption function as part of fiscal policy used as a sole 
control mechanism was^feaslble due to the need for monetary 
policy In support of Its operation.
The conduct of the prevailing Inflexible monetary policy 
was becoming a troublesome problem.®During World War II, 
yields and prices of Treasury securities had been stabilized 
In a situation In which investors had few alternative outlets 
for their money. Since post-war business was booming and In­
vestment opportunities were wide-spread, "pegging" Government
?John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest. 
and Money. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 193^, pp. 95-96.
o
James. L. Knlpe, The Federal Reserve and the American 
Dollar (Chapel Hill: Thé University of North Carolina Press,
1965), pp. 50-62.
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securities prices and yields not only prevented the Federal 
Reserve Board from using its powers to limit inflation, but 
became an inflationary force in itself. The pegging policy 
made the entire marketable debt, regardless of stated maturity, 
convertible on demand into cash at the option of the holder 
and, therefore, practically as liquid as money. Moreover, 
so long as all Treasury maturities were supported at fixed 
prices or yields, control of the money supply passed over to 
the holders of Government securities. The Fed had to buy to 
maintain support-price levels regardless of what happened to 
the money supply.
The Federal Reserve Board, however, began to move cau­
tiously toward a somewhat greater degree of flexibility as 
early as 1946.9 The approach was to gradually withdraw from 
the committment to buy short-term pegged Treasury securities. 
With this, the Fed wouldn’t lose control of the money supply 
if holders of the still-supported, long-term Treasury obliga­
tions began to sell them to the Fed at the support prices.
Free from concern about short-term yields, the Fed could 
sell short-term Governments to recapture the reserve funds 
it released when it purchased long-terms. The next develop­
ment the Fed had to handle was massive sales of nearly 
$11 billion of long-term Government bonds in the year ending
^United States Congress, Subcommitte on General Credit 
Control, Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public 
Debt; Replies To Questions and Other Material. 82nd Congress, 
2nd Session, 1952, Part I, pp. 52-^4.
8
November, 1948, by insurance companies, banks, and other 
investors vAio were raising cash for higher yielding private 
loans and who were also protecting themselves against the 
possibility that the Fed would be unable, or unwilling, to 
support long-term Government bond prices indefinitely*^^
Had the Fed not taken the precaution to free short-term 
Government securities, the full impact of these $11 billion 
bond purchases would have caused a corresponding rise in bank 
reserves and an even larger increase in the money supply. As 
it was, the sales of short-term Government securities offset 
the effects of the purchases of long-terms. Since the Treasury 
was retiring securities out of its cash surplus, the Fed 
holdings of Government securities actually declined during 
this period.
This 1947-1948 experience could have been more chaotic 
and disastrous. Had the torrent of sales of long-term bonds 
gone on for another year at the same rate, it would have ex­
hausted the Fed's holdings of short-terms which were being 
sold to prevent the expansion of bank reserve positions and 
the money supply. It was only a coincidence that the 1949 
recession developed to slow credit demands and sales of bonds 
by lending institutions. However, the Fed had not been able 
to prevent the private sector from substantially increasing
loibia.
9
its liquidity by the trade of long-term bonds for short-term 
obligations sold by the Fed.
In retrospect, the Federal Reserve Monetary Policy was 
rendered temporarily useless by the Truman Administration in 
the 1946-1948 cycle. The Fed was forced to rely almost entire­
ly on (1) the regulation of consumer credit, and (2) pleading 
with commercial banks and other interests to.excercise self- 
control, while (3) unsuccessfully requesting legislation to 
permit the institution of a new kind of supplementary reserves 
whicî  supposedly, would restore the general monetaiy control 
mechanisms to working order.^^The few feeble attempts at the 
use of the discount rate and reserve requirement adjustment 
mechanisms were meaningless due to the Fed’s pre-occupation 
with Government pegged securities. Chairman Eccles was told 
in late January, 1948, that he was not going to be re-appointed 
Chairman of the Board.
The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, brought 
about a wave of inflationary borrowing and spending. The 
result was a struggle between the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Treasury, and the President. The issue was whether the 
long-term Government bond market should continue to be sup­
ported on a 2 1/2# basis. The outcome was the Treasury-
Federal Reserve Accord of March 3, 1951. More will be
^^Knipe, op. cit.. pp. 54-61.
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mentioned of the Accord later. For the present purpose, the
Accord meant that the Fed was to conduct flexible monetary
and credit policies as needed to Influence appropriately the
Ipgeneral economic situation.^ Basically, It restored to the 
Federal Reserve Board the ^freedom to pursue an Independent 
monetary policy, subject to the obligation to maintain orderly 
conditions In the government securities m a r k e t . "^3
Since 1951, the Fed has followed a fairly vigorous 
counter-cyclical monetary policy. Counter-cyclical monetary 
policy Is that which allows the Fed "to exert pressure on 
member bank reserves and causing Interest rates to rise during 
business expansion and shifting, as quickly as needed, to a 
policy of credit ease when business declines and prices stop 
rising rapidly.
12United States Congress, op. clt.. pp. 362-368.
^^Robert Aaron Gordon, Business Fluctuations (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1961), p. 586.
, p. 587.
CHAPTER II
FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY CONTROL MECHANISMS
United States monetary policy is, primarily, the regu­
lation of the volume of member bank reserves. The Federal 
Reserve Board, in its execution of monetary policy, has three 
control mechanisms at its disposal: (1) the open market oper­
ation, (2) member bank reserve requirement adjustment, and
(3) the discount rate. Each of these mechanisms directly 
affect member bank reserves.
The Open Market Operation
The Federal Reserve Board, in its daily operation, relies 
upon open market operations as its most sensitive and effec­
tive instrument for regulating member bank reserves. The 
reserve base is regulated weekly and monthly through the pur­
chase and sale of securities by the central bank. When the 
central bank sells securities, member bank reserves are reduced 
by the amount bought. The reverse happens when the central 
bank buys securities.
During monetary restraint, open market operations tend
to provide a smdla* amount of bank reserves than is called for
15by the demands for bank credit. As such, the needed reserves
David P. Eastburn, The Federal Reserve on Record: 
Readings on Current Issues from Statements by Federal Reserve 
Officials. (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965), p. 99.
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must be obtained through the discount window. In determin­
ing how open market operations will affect the potential for 
bank credit and monetary expansion, the Board must consider 
the amount of reserves member banks have borrowed at Reserve 
banks or are likely to borrow at the prevailing discount rates. 
The amount of excess reserves of member banks must also be 
considered. The necessity of this is that increases or 
decreases in the supply of funds based upon bank reserve 
requirements have a great impact upon interest rates,
A reversal of monetary restraint also sees open market 
operations and discount policy coordinate. As reserves are 
supplied at the Fed's initiative, one result is that member 
banks are enabled to repay their indebtedness at Reserve banks. 
As such, excess reserves at member banks accrue and are used 
for loan and investment expansion,
Membér Bank Reserve Requirement Adjustment
Changes in member bank reserve requirements, less flex­
ible and adaptable than open market and discount operations, 
are used occasionally. Usually, these changes are applied 
to situations of more than temporary significance. Reserve 
requirement percentages have been reduced in recessions, for 
example, to make reserves available at the same time to all 
member banks. Sometimes reserve adjustments are made to help
p. 100,
13
offset sustained gold flows or to accomodate structural 
adjustments in the banking system. Reserve adjustments are 
sometimes used in coordination to discount rate changes to 
intensify the degree of restraint or ease desired by the Fed.
When member bank reserve requirements are changed, the 
aggregate effect on market rates of interest is similar to 
open market operations, although there may be a difference 
in the timing of the effect. Most of the Impact of open 
market operations on interest rates is through the multiple 
expansion or contraction of bank credit and is based on the 
change in bank reserves which works themselves out over a 
fairly short period. The operations themselves, however, may 
be undertaken over a longer period. In the case of member 
bank reserve requirement changes, the impact on the market 
interest rates are fairly immediate since the requirements 
become effective on a selected date.
The Discount Rate
Basically, the discount rate is the rate charged by the 
Fed when member banks come to it to borrow reserves in times 
of stringency. The Fed considers the use of the discount 
window a privilège, not a right. Discount rates are adjusted 
by the Fed to signal to the public a change in or continuation 
of prevailing monetary policy, to affect the cost and availa­
bility of loanable funds, and to establish a pivotal rate 
around which other short-term interest rates tend to form.
14
Perhaps the main purpose of the discount window is to
"permit a gradual and orderly response on the part of banks
17to the reserve pressures that accompany monetary policy."
Member banks borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks through 
two methods. The first is when th^ rediscount short-term 
commercial, industrial, agricultural, or other short-term 
paper, with recourse on the borrowing bank. This procedure 
is called discounting and is practically obsolete. The second 
method is called advance. In this practice, the member banks 
may give their own promissory notes secured by paper eligible 
for discounting, by Government securities, or other satisfac­
tory collateral as determined by the Fed. Nearly all member 
bank borrowings are in the form of advances and discounts 
under Sections 13 and 13a of the Federal Reserve Act. Here, 
advances are secured by United States Government securities 
and discounts of, and advances secured by, eligible paper.
The other way of obtaining frunds from the Fed is through 
advances under Section 10(b). Here, the interest rate is one 
half percent higher than under sections 13 and 13a due to the 
nature of the paper secured. Most member bank borrowing is 
in the form of advances and discounts as under Sections 13 
and 13a due to convenience because collateral is free of 
credit risk, appraisable as to value, and more readily supplied
17The Federal Reserve System-Purposes and Functions. A 
50th Anniversary Edition prepared by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D. C., 1963) p. 40.
15
in large amounts.
In the borrowing procedure, the member bank's reserve
balance at the Fed is affected. When a member bank borrows,
the amount of the loan is added or credited to its reserve
balance. When the loan is repayed, the amount is deducted from
or charged against its balance. Advances to or discounts for
18a member bank are made for periods of up to 15 days.
Although monetary policy is ordinarly patterned after 
national rather than regional considerations, in the early 
years of the Fed, there was some tendency toward regional 
discount rates,l9?rior to 1922, discount rates varied accord­
ing to class of paper, maturity, and security, A differential 
pattern of regional discount rates was established during 
the I922-I923 period. At that time, higher and less frequent­
ly changed discount rates were experienced in agricultural 
regions than in Industrial and financial districts. During 
1927, discount rates became uniform. Since the 1930's, 
discount rates in all Federal Reserve districts have been 
uniform except during relatively short intervals.
Discount rates still vary in differnt Reserve districts, 
though for a short time only. The Board of Directors of the
p. 41.
IQThe Federal Reserve and the Treasury, Prepared for the 
Commission on Money and Credit by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and the United States Treasury 
Department (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, I963), p, 156,
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individual Reserve banks decide upon a discount rate ^every
fourteen days or less if deemed necessary.”̂ ^Although the
discount rate which is set isn*t required to be the same as
that fixed by all or a part of the other member banks, the
Board can produce uniformity by disapproving all rates which
aren't the desired rate at the time. For example, in 1957,
the New York bank reduced its discount rate from 3 1/2^ to
3 1/4^ while the remainder went down to 3%* The Board never
approved the New York reduction until it was in line with the
other banks. Although these instances are rare, the Board
can hold up rate change application until the majority adjusts, 
21then approve.
A lag in discount rate adjustments by Reserve banks is 
not alarming. A lag of two or three business days could 
reflect a difference between Reserve boards as to the time­
liness of the rate change or a difference in the regular meet­
ing dates. Longer periods of postponement may be due to a 
lack of enthusiasm for the discount rate change even though 
action is taken at the next regular meeting, since a special 
session could have been called. If a regular meeting of the 
Reserve board (or when the board meets monthly, a date 14 days 
after the regular meeting) passes without the rate moving
^^Hobart C. Carr, "A Note on Regional Differences in 
Discount Rates," Journal of Finance. XV (March, I960), p. 62.
Zllbld.
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into conformity, the lag probably reflects a Judgment that the 
move by the other Reserve bank or banks was premature or
mistaken.22
The use of borrowed funds by member banks to avoid a 
legal reserve deficiency is intended to be a temporary supple­
ment and not a substitute for a bank's adaptation of its own 
asset holdings to the communities supply of and demand for 
credit. Three different influences prevent member bank 
borrowings from departing too far from standard:2^(i) the 
discount rate itself, (2) bank reluctance to borrow, and (3) 
administrative action by discounting officials.
The discount rate itse-lf may be a deterrent against 
borrowing. Since the discount rate represents a cost which 
banks pay in relation to alternative sources of funds (namely. 
Federal Funds, selling assets, and drawing down balances with 
and borrowing from correspondent banks), if the rate is 
higher than short-term market rates, the idea of borrowing 
will likely be discredited. As such, the most relevant 
comparison of the discount rate as a deterrent is with the 
costs of alternative sources of funds available. A false 
notion in relation to this is that the discount rate discour­
ages member bank borrowing and that this leads to a tightening 
of bank lending operations. This idea is refuted by the fact 
that discount rates are generally at the low spectrum of
22ibid.. p. 63.
^^The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit., 
pp. 129-133.
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pii.interest rates.
Reluctance toward borrowing prevents some member banks 
from utilizing the discount mechanism. The soundness of 
borrowing is questioned by some bankers. The bank's board 
of directors or larger depositors may consider discount use 
unfavorable. An avoidance of indebtedness over extended 
periods of time other than absolutely necessary reduces use 
of the discount mechanism. Some bankers are sensitive to 
inquiries by the Federal Reserve discount officials concerning 
their borrowing, and, as such, they avoid it.
Administrative action by the Federal Reserve discount 
officials can prevent member banks from borrowing. If the 
Federal Reserve, through Its continuous appraisal of member 
bank portfolios, finds that they are using Federal Reserve 
credit for other than temporary, seasonal, or emergency 
needs, action Is taken as to why. Federal Reserve policing 
action directly involves only a minority of borrowing banks. 
However, the effect of any administrative contact seems likely 
to continue for some time and spread beyond the particular 
member bank involved, A major problem in policing Is that of 
communloation--the conveying of a correct and uniform under­
standing of the usage of the discount mechanism. When the 
discount window was revived In 1955, the Fed considered it 
necessary to re-educate member bankers on the use of the
^^Paul S, Nadler, "What Does the Discount Rate Really 
Do?" Banking. LVIII (June, 1966), p. 34,
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discount mechanism. Lastly, there is a tendency for bankers 
to be somewhat optimistic as to the likely duration of unex­
pected reserve drains. As such, the member banks may be 
slow in adjusting.
CHAPTER III
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM'S USE 
OF THE DISCOUNT RATE
Primarily, discount rate changes are designed to keep 
them in line with short-term market rates— those rates on 
short-term liquid securities ranging from the shortest 
Treasury bills to Government and other securities of some­
what longer maturity that banks hold as secondary reserves. 
Discount rate changes are also considered by the Fed as a 
signal of present and future intentions in regard to monetary 
policy. International monetary conditions also affect Fed's 
changing of the discount rate. Before these subjects may be 
effectively discussed, an understanding of the member bank's 
relation with the discount rate is needed.
A member bank's decision as to the most desirable way 
for it to make an immediate adjustment in its reserve position 
is affected by the level of the discount rate in relation to 
market rates of interest. The cost of adjusting a reserve 
position by borrowing is the interest charge incurred. This 
cost is measured by the interest earnings sacrificed when it 
sells securities to acquire funds. As such, a bank's prefer­
ence of the alternatives available to acquire funds is greatly 
influenced by their cost. In considering the cost, the relation
25The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit., p. 121.
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of the discount rate to the cost of borrowing from banks 
(the Federal Funds market) and to market yields on Treasury 
bills and other securities held as liquid assets or as sec­
ondary reserves.
The movement of the discount rate is closely related to 
the movement of short-term market interest rates.^^When credit 
demands expand strongly, short-term market rates tend to rise. 
This is caused by member banks selling Treasury bills and 
other readily marketable paper to obtain funds to meet rapid 
loan expansion. If short-term market rates rise above the 
discount rates, member banks have a greater tendency to borrow 
at Reserve Banks because it is less costly in adjusting their 
reserve positions. However, the Fed, through the Reserve 
Banks, is then likely to raise the discount rate in order to 
keep the discount mechanism functioning as a deterrent to 
unduly rapid expansion of bank credit. Failure to raise the 
discount rate in line with market rates would encourage and 
enlarge member bank use of the discount window. However, if 
the discount rate is raised above market rates, member banks 
will sell Government securities to the Fed to satisfy reserve 
requirements because of less cost. These sales tend to 
drive short-term interest rates up to or above the discount 
rate because they increase the market supply of short-term 
securities relative to demand.
^^The Federal Reserve System-Purposes and Functions. 
op. cit.. pp. 47-49.
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Therefore, In a period of strong credit demands, short-term 
market rates and the discount rate are likely to rise con­
gruent ly until the demand pressures subside.
Numerous influences affect the timing and extent of dis­
count rate changes by the Fed, As mentioned, discount rates 
will be increased when they are lagging behind market rates 
in order to keep the discount window under control and to 
maintain a discipline of indebtedness on member banks. Since 
discount rates which are higher than market rates will encour­
age repayment of existing debt to the Reserve banks, a rise 
may reflect this fact. Sometimes balance-of-payments consid­
erations affect the timing and extent of discount rate changes; 
since discount rates deal with short-term market rates, they
27have an impact on international short-term capital movements.
If short-term market rates fall below discount rates in times 
of easing credit and less pressing loan demands, discount 
rates would likely be lowered to short-term rate levels. In 
this situation, discount rates would be lowered in order to 
reduce member banks' incentive to repay Reserve banks. This 
would encourage banks to utilize a greater portion of their 
reserves to expand loans and investments.
The discount rate has, at times, remained high or low 
relative to market rates for a long period. This phenomenon
^^The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit.. p. 123.
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results either because the frequency of Treasury financing 
has left few opportunities at the time discount rates could 
be conveniently altered, or because market rates may have 
been considered to be under transitory forces and expected 
to return closer to earlier levels and to the discount rate. 
During recession and monetary ease, a discount rate as low as 
market rates might not be considered necessary because at this 
time discount rate changes have little effect on banking 
actions.2®
The discount rate is sometimes raised for technical 
reasons; to keep it in line with money market rates else­
where.29This is done so that member banks are not overly 
tempted to try to borrow when they should be meeting reserve 
stringencies by reducing secondary reserves. Such string­
encies occur when member banks lend aggressively and must 
borrow for this reason rather than through unanticipated fund 
outflows.
Discount rates may be changed by the Fed to signal to 
the public a change in, or reinforcement of, the prevailing 
Federal Reserve credit and monetary policy. When the Fed 
raises the discount rate, it indicates that credit policy 
either has been tightening or will soon tighten. A reduction 
of the discount rate proclaims that a period of greater
28ibld.
^Nadler, o e. clt., p. 35.
24
credit ease and lessened restraint will be prevalent.
Although discount rates may be increased by the Fed with the 
purpose of signalling monetary intentions, adjustments, through 
their own nature, accomplish this purpose. However, perhaps 
the greatest significance from a discount rate change is in 
signalling Fed's present and future intentions.
There is a general understanding that when the discount 
rate is raised, interest rates are likely to rise generally 
throughout the economy. When discount rates fall, the reverse 
is considered to happen. The notion often held is that when 
the discount rate rises, it-costs member banks more to borrow 
from the Fed, thus banks have to offset the higher cost 
through higher bank rates, and these higher rates in turn 
with the borrowing and spending of the general public.
However, it is the Federal Reserve's open market operations 
which accompany the discount rate change that alters the state 
of the money market.
When the Fed raises the discount rate, open market oper­
ations supplement the change to produce the desired result 
of the move. With the discount rate increase, sales of 
Government securities absorb reserves from member banks and 
lessen the availability of credit. This, in turn, makes 
credit tighter and makes it more difficult to borrow. When 
the discount rate is lowered, open market operations consist 
of purchasing securities. This action brings about the easing
30Ibid.
25
of credit availability rather than the discount rate change 
itself. The lowering of the discount rate in this instance 
simply signals Fed's easy policy since there is usually little 
impact on the economy through the lowered rate.
Although interest rates than banks charge usually move 
in the same direction as discount rates, the result isn't due 
solely to the discount rate change. It reflects the expec­
tation of the financial community that the availability of 
credit is being altered by the Fed and that basic supply and 
demand forces will bring about the change in interest rates 
that the Fed is signalling. The greatly fluid financial 
markets react to the expected future conditions immediately. 
Thus, banks often change their lending rates as soon as the 
discount rate is altered,
^^Nadler, op, cit.. p, 35.
CHAPTER IV
FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT RATE CHANGES: 1951-1965
The importance of the discount rate mechanism was 
greatly increased by the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord on 
March 3, 1951.^^The Accord provided that the prices of Govern­
ment securities were to be no longer ^pegged” by open market 
actions; that short-term Government securities would be 
allowed to fluctuate more than in the past, around the dis­
count rate. The practice of acquiring loanable funds by 
selling Government securities at a profit was eliminated.
The Accord moved that securities could only be sold at a dis­
count thus causing banks to become more reluctant to take 
book losses on Government sales in order to make loans. As 
such, the discount window began to look more and more attrac­
tive to member banks. Toward the end of 1952, member bank 
borrowings from the Fed had climbed to over $1.5 billion from 
$242 million in March, 1951. Another stipulation of the 
Accord was that the discount rate would remain at 1 3,4# for 
the remainder of 1951. The Accord, then, re-affirmed the 
Federal Reserve System's purpose, that is to conduct flexible
^^George W. McKinney, Jr., The Federal Reserve Discount 
Window. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, I960), 
p. 22.
NOTE: All figures of discount rates, money market rates,
and member bank borrowings in this paper were obtained from 
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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monetary and credit policies as needed to influence appropri­
ately the general economic situation.
The first discount rate change after the Accord was 
brought about at the end of a six month plateau of the 1950- 
1954 cycle. Rising employment, stable values, and economic 
growth were characteristic at the end of 1952, Since the 
expansion represented an inflationary potential, the Fed 
continued to pursue a policy directed toward slowing the 
pace of bank credit expansion with a goal of reducing inflation­
ary activity. As such, the discount rate was increased dur­
ing January 16-23, 1953, (as mentioned, there is a slight 
lag between Reserve Bank adoption of the uniform discount 
rate) to 2% from 1 'b/k% set in August, 1950, The increase 
was designed to align it with short-term market rates and to 
help restrict undue expansion in bank credit by promoting 
greater reluctance on the part of member banks to resort to 
the discount w i n d o w . 32
The discount rate increase was to late to have any mean­
ing as a control measure, however. Three month Treasury bills 
had risen to 1.81^ by July, 1952, and were 1.99# on the week 
ending January 10, 1953. Federal Funds rates had slightly 
surpassed the previous 1 3/4# discount rate in late December
^^Eastburn, pp, cit,. p, 82,
30
and early January. The initial effect of the discount rate, 
however, was a stricter attitude toward member bank borrowing 
on the part of Federal Reserve bank loan officers. This
attitude is considered to have brought about the borrowing
33reduction, not the rate change itself.
In addition to the discount rate change, the Fed used 
another weapon. In February, 1953, margin requirements on 
loans for purchasing and carrying listed securities were 
reduced from 75% to 50% of market value. The Fed wanted to 
lower the requirement that would be adequate to prevent 
excessive use of credit for purchasing and carrying stocks. 
Also, between January and April, 1953, the Fed open market 
committee sold and redeemed $800 million of United States 
Government securities to offset seasonal changes affecting 
member bank reserves and to maintain pressure on these reserve 
positions.
33Knipe, op. cit.. p. 285.
^^Eastbum, op. cit.. p. 81.
NOTE: After each discussion of a change in the discount
rate, a chart will follow illustrating money market rates, 
the discount rate, and member bank borrowing for the year of 
the discount rate adjustment.
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The context of the 1954 discount rate changes was in a 
relatively mild recession. The contraction lasted until 
August, 1954, The recession was due, primarily, to inventory 
in that general defense expenditures declined whereas non­
inventory investment didn*t.^^The ensuing Fed discount rate 
reductions in the first half of the year signalled an easier 
monetary and credit policy aimed at lowering the cost of 
money to stimulate Investment in inventory.
The two discount rate reductions in 1954 were designed 
to align it closer to market rates of interest and to elim­
inate any undue deterrent to bank borrowing from the Fed,^^
The first discount rate reduction was during February 5-15, 
1954, to 1 3/4# from 2#, Three month Treasury bills averaged 
1,18# in January and 1,01# on the week ending January 30. The 
Federal Funds rate was down to 0,78# in January down from 
1,61# in November, 1953. The prime rate (that rate of interest 
which member banks charge customers of unquestioned credit) 
was reduced to 3# from 3.25# just prior to the second discount 
rate change in 1954 in anticipation of it. The second discount 
rate change occured during April 14-May 21. The rate was 
reduced to 1 1/2# from 1 3/4#. Three month Treasury bill 
yields averaged 1,03# in March and 1,00# on the week ending
35(jordon, op. cit,. p, 489. 
^^Eastburn, op, cit.. p. 82,
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April 10. Before uniformity In the discount rate was reached, 
Treasury bill rates had dropped to .75% on the week ending 
May 15 from .96% In April. The Federal Funds rate dropped 
from 1.56% In February to .75% In May. Member bank borrowing 
Increased by nearly #200 million In February over the January 
average, but slowly decreased and remained relatively constant. 
(See page 34)
Other Fed countercyclical mechanisms coordinated with 
the manipulation of the discount rate. Buying rates on 90- 
day bankers* acceptances were reduced from 2 1/8% to 1 3/4%
In February and to 1 1/2% In Aprll-May. The Fed reasoning 
here Is the same as discount rate reduction reasoning. Also, 
open market operations produced a net sales of about $900 
million of United States Government securities between January 
and June. These sales were to absorb part of the reserves 
made available by seasonal deposit contraction and to return 
the flow of currency thereby further easing bank reserve
positions.37
The Importance of the discount rate mechanism as a 
countercyclical monetary tool was emphasized In January,
1955, by a Federal Reserve revision of Regulation A, that 
which deals with advances and discounts. The revision con­
doned and promoted the Idea of the discount rate mechanism.
3?Ibld.
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The revision stated that access to Federal Reserve discount
facilities is granted as a privilege of membership to the
Federal Reserve in light of the following principles:^®
”1, Credit is generally extended on a short-term basis 
to a member bank in order to enable it to adjust its 
asset position when necessary because of developments 
such as sudden withdrawal of deposits or seasonal 
requirements for credit beyond those which can be 
reasonably met by use of the bank's own resources.
2. Federal Reserve credit is available for longer 
periods when necessary in order to assist member 
banks in meeting unusual situations, such as may 
result from national, regional, or local defaults or 
from exceptional circumstances involving only part 
of the banks. Under ordinary conditions, continuous 
use of Federal Reserve credit by member banks over
a considerate period of time is not regarded as ap­
propriate.
3. Each Federal Reserve bank gives due regard to the 
purpose of credit and to its probable effects upon 
the maintenance of sound credit conditions, both as 
to the individual institutions and the economy, gen­
erally. It keeps informed of and takes into account 
the general character and amount of loans and invest­
ments of member banks. It determines if banks are 
borrowing principally from rate differentials and 
whether the bank is extending an undue amount of 
credit for the speculatory carrying of or trading
in securities, real estate, or commodities, or other­
wise.
4. Application for Federal Reserve credit accomo­
dation and considered by a Federal Reserve bank is 
in light of its best Judgment in conformity with the 
foregoing principles and with the provisions of the 
Federal Reserve Act and Regulation A.”
pp. 8—l4.
^^Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLI (January, 1955),
36
In 1955, the economic situation was that of the begin­
ning of the 1955-1957 durable goods boom. This upswing was 
unique. First, It was the first post-war expansion not 
directly related to war. It was concentrated In the durable 
goods Industrie*, and unemployment did not fall below four 
percent. The rapid rise In prices and the vigorous Invest­
ment boom led monetary authorities to follow a restrictive 
monetary policy, while the slow growth In output after 1955 
and the existence of pockets of unemployment led many observers 
to advocate a policy of monetary ease.^^
As such, 1955 was an active year for discount rate 
adjustments. The first discount rate change was an Increase 
during April 14-May 2 to 1 3/4^ from 1 1/2%. Since the econ­
omy was In the eighth month of the expansionary upswing and 
Fed policy had been greatly restraining through the eight 
months, the Increase couldn't be regarded as a signal. The 
rate was, primarily, raised to align It with open-market 
money rates and to make borrowing by banks more expensive.
Three month Treasury bills averaged 1.28% In March and were 
1.49% on the week ending April 9* During the adoption of the 
discount rate by member banks, bill rates rose to 1.63% on the 
week ending April 16, to 1.65% on the week ending April
^^Gordon, op. clt.. p. 493. 
^Ognlpe, pp. clt.. p. 285.
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23, and down to 1.62% on the week ending April 30. The Fed­
eral Funds rate was 1.42# in.early April and 1.69# in May.
In conjunction with the discount rate increase, margin require­
ments on loans for purchasing or carrying listed securities 
were increased from 60# to 70# of market value. The Fed 
wanted to help prevent an excessive use of credit for pur­
chasing or carrying securities in a period of increasing use 
of credit for carrying securities.
As the upswing continued, the Fed applied restrictive 
policies more firmly. Discount rates were increased from 
1 3/4# to 2 1/4# from August 4 to September 13 and to 2 l/2# 
during November 18-23. The Fed wanted to keep the discount 
rate in appropriate relationship with market rates of inter­
est to maintain a deterrent on excessive borrowing by member
42banks at the Reserve banks. Three month Treasury bills aver­
aged 1.60# in July and increased to 2.07# on the week ending 
November 19. Federal Funds rates averaged 1.92# in July and 
2.85# in November. Insofar as the discount raises in August 
and November had any value in confirming a restrictive Fed 
policy of long standing, it was somewhat dissipated in the 
confustion of the August-September raises. The Cleveland 
Reserve Bank increased its rate from 1 3/4# to 2 1/4# in
^^Eastburn, o£. cit.. p. 83.
42Ibid.. p. 85.
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August while the remainder went only to 2%. In September, 
the other eleven Reserve banks increased their discount rates 
to Cleveland's 2 1/4^. This disparity reduced any effect of 
a signal intention by the Fed.
Repercussions on the money market after the November 
18-23 discount rate increase were extensive. Three month 
Treasury bills rose to 2.44^ in mid-November, the highest in 
25 years. The price of Government bonds dropped sharply. 
Member banks raised interest rates on loans to brokers and 
security dealers from 3 1/2^ to 3 1/4#. Commercial paper 
dealers and major finance companies boosted by 1/8 point the 
interest they charged on short-term loans.^^Pederal funds 
were quoted at over 2.5# which Indicated that tightness was 
prevalent throughout the banking system and the major finance 
companies raised rates by 1/4#, the seventh such increase of
1955.^^Prime rates rose to 3 1/4# from 3#'on August 4, and 
to 3 1/2# on October 14.^^After the November discount rate, 
there was an indication of another increase, but it never 
materialized.
The Federal Reserve Board wanted the money market to
"Another Push on the Brakes," Business Week. 
(November 26, 1955), p. 25.
^^"Bank Loans Will Cost More," Business Week.
(September 3, 1955), p. 32.
^^"Another Push on the Brakes," op. cit.. p. 25.
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tighten to slow down the economy. The Fed denied a charge 
that it was trying to halt borrowing. It said that it didn't 
intend to halt legitimate borrowing, but it did intend to 
control the supply of credit by keeping reins on the pre­
vailing expansion and to hold prices in check.^^Since member 
banks were borrowing more freely (See page 40 ), and liking it,* 
the Fed wanted to put a limit on this by slightly penalizing 
this activity.
During 1955, Federal Reserve open market operations were 
actively combating inflation. Between March and December, 
open market operations made net purchases of bankers' accep­
tances totaling $28 million to recognize the increased use of 
them by business as a means of financing international trade. 
Between July and December, the Fed made outright purchases 
of Treasury bills totaling $700 millon net to aid member 
banks in meeting reserve needs of seasonal nature and further 
increasing indebtedness. The Fed also purchased new Treasury 
certificates of indebtedness of $167 million during November 
and December to supply reserves and to be consistent with 
the prevailing open market policy.^?
Ibid.. p. 26.
47 _'Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 84.
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Çy the beginning of 1956, the economy was operating to 
full capacity, with demand outstripping supply in the durable 
goods industries. Consumer expenditures for other than 
services flattened out markedly in 1956 and the proportion of 
income saved began to rise. As such, inventory investment 
declined during 1956. Although a minor recession was in order, 
continued expansion in business fixed investment, a rapid 
increase in exports, and a rise in federal expenditures after
kOthe middle of 1956 combated that possibility. Thus, a heavily 
restrictive monetary policy was imposed until May and was 
eased in the second half of the year.
In light of the restrictive policy in effect, the discount 
rate was increased during April 13-20 by 1/4# at ten Reserve 
banks to 2 3/4# and to 3# at the San FransIsco and Minneapolis 
banks. The rate rise was a matter of good timing. **Free 
Reserves” were at a negative $4o8 million in March. Member 
bank borrowing was up to #993 million. Three month Treasury 
bill rates averaged 2.25# in March and were up to 2.38# on the 
week ending April 7. Federal Funds rates averaged over 2.5# 
in March. The rationale behind the discount rate increase 
was to increase restraint on credit expansion in view of a 
sharp increase in bank credit in March and indications of 
broad increases in spending, growing demands for credit, and
48Gordon, 0£. cit.. p. 495.
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upward pressures on prices and costs.4#
Up to this point, the prevailing restrictive monetary 
policy had not evoked public opposition. However, with the 
granting of San Fransisco and Minneapolis a 1/4^ higher 
discount rate, the Fed found itself in a quandary. This 
conspicuous action was taken at a time when the business sit­
uation had been developing a few signs of weakness and the 
production total had leveled off for several months. Instead 
of keeping quiet and assessing the situation more throughly, 
the Fed acted on the rate in a way that suggested that all 
twelve banks felt more restraint was needed but two felt that 
much more was needed. The press, to which the Fed said 
nothing, just announced the actions. The Fed, for its own 
record, commented that the raise *also served as a signal to 
those businesses planning to finance plant and equipment ex­
pansion throught the capital markets that higher borrowing 
costs might be anticipated if the supply of savings was taxed 
further by demands for capital."^0
Partly due to the furor which arose after the April move, 
the Fed instituted an easing policy which lasted from May, 
1956, through January, 1957. However, the other discount rate 
change in 1956 was an increase during August 24-31 when the 
Fed approved raises of 1/4^ to the ten banks which were not
49Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 85. 
^^Knipe, op. cit.. pp. 286-287.
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already at 3^. The rationale.was to move the discount rate 
in conformity with rises in market rates resulting from vig­
orous credit demands. Three month Treasury bills averaged 
2.31# in July and increased to 2.64# on the week ending August 
18, Federal Funds rates averaged 2.81# in July. Also, the 
Fed wanted to signal the financial and business community 
and the public the need for credit restraint and for resis­
tance to inflationary developments.^^In light of an easing 
action by the Fed, however, this increase was puzzling.
Perhaps, the prime objective of the August rate increase
was to limit the supply of funds so that credit would become
52tighter, excluding meeting seasonal needs. The Fed hoped 
that the new raise would cool the demand for credit and thus 
keep the economy from indulging in a speculative inflationary 
outburst. If the Fed supplied all the credit that the business 
and consumer wanted, an all out inflation would be incited, due 
to the fact that money was exceeding need due partly to the 
end of the steel strikes, which was bringing about a wave 
of inventory accumulation. Since the Fed didn't want lenders 
to give into the pleas of borrowers, the prime rate was in­
creased from 3 3/4# to 4# in anticipation of tighter money 
due to the proposed discount rate increase in August.
^^Knipe, op. cit.. p. 287.
^^”Banks Leap in to Raise Money Rates," Business Week, 
(August 25, 1956), pp. 30-31.
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Open market operations again complemented discount rate 
changes in 1956. During April and May, open market operations 
included sales of Government securities of #550 million to 
supplement the April discount rate increase. The move was 
made to increase restraint on credit expansion. During 
August and November, Fed open market operations purchased 
nearly #1 billion of Government securities.^^This action was 
taken during the August discount rate increase. In this 
instance, open market operations seemed to be in opposition 
rather than supplementary to the discount rate change. Since 
open market operations usually consist of sales of Govern­
ment securities during a discount rate increase to tighten 
credit, the August-November action seemed out of place.
However, since the Fed was adopting an easing monetary policy, 
the open market operations were to supply member banks with 
reserves since the discount rate was only trying to match 
short-term market rates.
The 1956 discount rate increases may be said to have begun 
a new evolution of the importance of it as a signal of Federal 
Reserve intentions. Since member banks actively resumed the 
pre-depression practice of borrowing, the discount rate became 
a major control weapon which the Fed chose to exploit. A 
cardinal point in Federal Reserve doctrine is that the value 
of member bank borrowing is the decisive factor in determining
^^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 85.
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54the condition of the money market.
The discount rate increase from '3% to 3 1/2# during
August 9-23, 1957, was a timing error by the Fed. By August,
the economy had been in an upswing for 36 months. The economy
seemed tired with imbalances in inventories and plant and
equipment and general business activity continued to move
sideways. The first half of 1957 saw new orders for durable
goods declining, excess capacity curtailing investment pro-
55grams, tight money, and declining profit margins.^Federal 
Reserve policy was that of general credit restraint. Disagree­
ment was encountered with the policy because of the uneven 
effects it had on different prospective borrowers; e.g. funds 
lack affected the financing of new homes, small business, 
schools, roads, and hospitals. Also, the policy was attacked 
because it diverted lending to lending and Investing institu­
tions which could get permanent business from small and large 
business. As for the money market, three month Treasury bills 
had been averaging above the 3# discount rate since December,
1956. Federal Funds rates had been averaging 3# since the 
first of 1957. Member bank borrowings had climbed steadily. 
And, the prime rate had been increased from 4# to 4 1/2# in
^̂ hEdward C. Simmons, ”A Note on the Revision of Federal 
Reserve Discount Policy, XI (December, 1956), p. 413.
^^Gordon, op. cit.. pp. 496-497.
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August in anticipation to a discount rate increase and tight­
er money. The discount rate increase which followed was the 
seventh consecutive increase of credit restrictions since 
April, 1955, and the 5 l/2% rate was the highest in 23 years.
The rational behind the discount rate increase, accord­
ing to the Federal Reserve Board was to bring it in closer
alignment with short-term money rates and to maintain a
57restrictive effect of member bank borrowing. Undoubtedly, 
this reasoning must be taken in a different light considering 
the tremendous lag in adjustment to market rates, William 
McGhesney Martin, Ohaifman of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors at that time and presently, said that strong in­
flationary pressures still existed. Thus, he was willing to 
see money get tighter if demand for credit kept on growing. 
"Restraint on the growth of credit is still required," accord­
ing to Chairman Martin, "because Inflation is clearly the most 
critical economic problem now facing this country.The Fed 
thinking was that the economy would begin expansion with the 
removal of inflationary pressures and a greater-than-seasonal 
demand for credit.^9
^^"New Discount Move Adds Heat To Tight Money Debate," 
Business Week. (August 17, 1957), p. 29.
^"^Eastburn, cit.. p. 86,
^^"New Discount Move Adds Heat To Tight Money Debate," 
op. cit.. p. 30.
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The Immediate down-turn of the economy after the discount 
rate increase in August couEln*t be blaimed entirely on it. it 
could be said that the Fed failed miserably in using the rate 
as an economic or public relations tool. The Board appa rently 
saw the lack of flness in its discount rate manipulation in 
that it tried to minimize the meaning of the rise, contrary 
to the basic use of the rate, a signal of Fed intentions.
The New York Times on August 11, 1937, correctly defined the
Fed's actions by stating, "Federal Reserve Board officials--
took pains to term the subsequent advance in the discount 
rate as routine and largely meaningless, a symbolic evidence 
of continued steady restraint. In recent years, they were 
careful to point out,, changes in the discount rate more often 
followed changes in other market rates than led them.**̂ ^
The other discount rate change in 1957 was considered as 
the first one which "said something to the world". Between 
November 15 and December 2, the Fed approved a discount 
reduction from the prevailing 3 1/2# to 3#* This move was 
considered by economic and financial experts as a model oper­
ation on the part of discount rate manipulation for the sig­
nalling of the Fed's intentions, a reversal of the previous 
tight credit and money policy. Although the Fed bowed to 
the Eisenhower Administration's pressure through concern of
^^Knipe, 22. cit.. p. 289.
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a threat of business downturn, the Board still continued to 
eqplBSize inflationary d a n g e r s . s u c h ,  the reduction was 
aimed to reduce the cost of borrowing from the Reserve banks 
and to eliminate any undue restraint on bank borrowing in
view of the decline in business activity and evidences of
62economic recession. An important outcome of the discount 
rate reduction was the prime rate decrease from 4 \/2% to 
4#.
Open market operations in 1957 were complementary to the 
discount rate changes. From July to mid-October small amounts 
of Government securities were bought and sold by the Fed.
These actions supplemented the discount rate mechanism in 
that it met changing reserve needs and maintained continuing 
presure on member bank reserve positions. Open market oper­
ations from mid-October to December supplemented the November- 
Dee ember discount rate reduction. The operations increased 
the availability of bank reserves and subsequently cushioned 
recessionary tendencies in the economy.
Discount rate adjustments in 1958 were numerous due to 
a recession during the first half of the year and economic 
expansion during the second half. The contraction which 
started in September, 1957, lasted until April, 1958, and was
^^Knipe, as* Pit.. p. 290. 
^^Eastburn, op. cit., p. 86.
^Ibld.. .
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one of the shortest contractions of the last century.
However, the briefness of it was accompanied by extremity. 
Industrial production declined 13.7%, Gross National Product 
declined 4.7%, and unemployment was the most severe of the 
recessions experienced since World War II.^^The recession was 
unique, however, in that prices continued to rise, contrary 
to typical recession price behavior.
As such, discount rates were reduced during the recession 
to lower the cost of borrowing from Reserve banks and to 
increase the availability of bank reserves in order to en­
courage dpsiit and monetary e x p a n s  i o n .  first discount rate
change during the recession was a reduction from 3% to 2 1/4% 
during January 22-March 21. The changes were made in a series 
of steps with San Francisco the last Reserve bank to conform. 
This lag blotted, somewhat, the effect of the reductions.
Three month Treasury bill rates on the week ending January 18 
dropped to 2.57% from the December, 1957, average of 3.04%. 
Federal Funds rates dropped from 2.18% in December, 1957, to 
1.67% in January, 1958. The prime rate was reduced to 4% from 
4 1/2% in January in anticipation of lowered discount rates. 
The January-March discount rate reduction was timely and 
signalled an extremely easy monetary policy in that reserve 
requirements were also reduced. In February, reserve
^̂ Grordon, o£. cit.. p. 497. 
^^Eastburn, o£. cit.. p. 87.
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requirements on demand deposits were reduced to 19 1/2# from 
20# central reserve city banks; to 17 1/2# from 18# at reserve 
city banks; and to 11 1/2# from 12# at country banks. This 
action freed #500 million of reserves. In March, reserve 
requirements on demand deposits were again lowered to 19# 
at central reserve city banks; to 17# at reserve city banks; 
and to 11# at country banks. This move freed an additional 
#500 million of reserves. 'These actions further supplemented 
easy monetary policy in progress.
In April, another assault against the recession was waged 
by the Fed. The discount rate was reduced during April 18- 
March 9 to 1 3/4#. This change lagged behind the easy mone­
tary and credit policy in effect since three month Treasury 
bills averaged 1.30# in March and were down to 1.10# on the 
week ending April 12. Federal Funds varied around 1.0# in 
March and the beginning of April. Reserve requirements on 
demand deposits were again reduced to 18# at central reserve 
city banks and to 16 1/2# at res eve city banks. This move 
freed an additional #450 million bf reserves.^®A major reason 
for the use of two control mechanisms by the Fed in April 
was to get member banks to lower the prime rate, which they 
weren't anxious to do. Rather than lower the prime rate, they 
were cutting service charges, reducing the necessity of
^^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 87.
GGlbld.
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maintaining a large compensatory deposit ratio, and arranging 
short-term loans for preferred customers through banker's 
acceptances, which then cost less than 2^*^%owever, the 
prime rate was reduced to 3 1/2# from 4# on the day of the 
discount rate change announcement.
In addition to the discount rate and reserve requirement 
reductions during the first half of 1958, open market oper­
ations encouraged bank credit and monetary expansion. Between 
and including February and June, nearly #2.2 billion of United 
States Government securities were purchased by the Fed to 
supplement reserve requirement actions in further increasing
availability of r e s e r v e s .
In retrospect, the extremity of Federal Reserve monetary 
and credit actions to combat the then prevailing recession 
was tremendous. The discount rate, during the first half of 
1958, was reduced by 1 l/4# beginning with the well timed 
January reduction. Reduced reserve requirements between and 
including February and April released nearly #1.5 billion of 
reserves. And, open market operations during the first half 
of the year increased member bank reserve positions by #2.2 
billion. With such concentrated Fed action, it is clear why 
the recession didn't last any longer than it did.
"Banks Follow the Fed's Lead," Business Week. 
(April 26, 1958), pp. 29-30.
70Eastburn, op. cit.. pp. 87-88.
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The upswing began in May, 1958. By August, it was in its 
fourth month. As such, monetary policy was reversed to a 
restrictive policy beginning with a discount rate increase 
from 1 3/4# to 2# between August 15 and September 23. This 
increase was seemingly more congruent with the prevailing 
economic and monetary conditions than in the past and was 
more tuned to the diming three-month Treasury bill rate 
which averaged .91# in July and 1.58# on the week ending 
August 16. The Federal Funds rate had met the discount rate 
by August. Other than to keep the discount rate in an appro­
priate relationship with market rates, the action increased 
the cost of borrowing by member banks in case of increasing 
demands for bank credit. The last discount rate manipulation 
of 1958 was during October 24-November 7 with an increase of 
1/2# to 2 1/2#. The rational behind this move was the same 
as the previous change. Three month Treasury bills had aver­
aged 2.44# in September and 2.67# on the week ending October 
18. The Federal Funds rate was averaging slightly above the 
2# discount rate.
While the discount rate changes couldn't be called out­
standing announcements to the public since it whs expected that 
credit would become tighter during the upswing, they were 
more aligned with the economic and monetary conditions of the 
time. Since with each upswing, the volume of stock purchased 
increases, the Fed raised margin requirements on loans for
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purchasing and/or carrying listed securities from 70^ to 
90^ of market value.?^One Important outcome of the discount 
rate increases in 1958 was the rise of the prime rate from 
3 1/2% to ^% during the August adjustment.
The Federal Reserve Board applied a restrictive monetary 
policy during 1959 to combat the prevailing upswing so that 
it wouldn't become inflationary. Subsequently, the discount 
rate was increased three times during the yeag largely as a 
routine matter. The rational behind all three discount rate 
increases was to keep the rates in appropriate relationship 
with the rise in market rates resulting from vigorous credit
7odemands and to restrain undue credit expansion. ^
The first change of the discount rate in 1959 was during 
March 6-16 to 3^ from 2 l/2%. Three month Treasury bills had 
hovered around 2.8# since December, 1958, and were 2.76# on 
the week ending February 28, 1959. Federal Funds rates had 
increased by 1/2# since the beginning of the year to around 
3#. Since the public already knew what the Fed's intentions 
were through open market actions, the discount rate increase 
in March was no new signal of intent. It was, perhaps, three 
months late. Prior to the increase. Fed open market opera­
tions sold $1 billion of United States Government securities 
to maintain restraint on credit expansion.T^As such, the
71Ibid.. p. 88. 72ibld.. p. 89. 73lbld..
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monetary system was controlled by open market operations until 
the discount rate changes came about.
Some factions of the money market were affected by the 
March discount rate change. Three month Treasury bills rose 
to 2.85% on the week ending March 14, but subsequently fell to 
2.76% by the end of the month. Yields on Treasury notes and 
bonds followed a similar pattern.
The next two discount rate changes of the year were also 
routine in nature. The second discount rate increase was 
during the May 29-June 12 period by 1/2% to 3 1/2%. Three 
month Treasury bills averaged 2.95% in April and 2.85% on 
the week ending May 23. The Federal Funds rate had slightly 
surpassed the 3% discount rate before the change. The affect 
of this discount adjustment was felt in the prime rate which 
was increased from 4% to 4 1/2% in May in anticipation of the
discount rate increase. The third discount rate increase was
during September 11-18, in the plateau of the 1958-1961 cycle, 
to 4% from 3 1/2%. Three month Treasury bills averaged 3.38% 
in August and were 3.95% on the week ending September 5 and 
4.02% on the week ending September 12. The Federal Funds
rate was also varying around 4% at the time. Nothing out­
standing can be said about these discount rate increases 
since they were well timed and considered as an accepted part 
of counter-cyclical monetary policy. Open market operations 
at this time bought and sold small amounts of United States
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Government securities to supply special reserve needs for 
limited periods.
The previous five discount rate increases were part of 
a more refined Fed discount policy. The increases, aggregat­
ing 2%, were mostly on time with economic conditions and 
public demands as well as with the Administration's desires. 
The performance of the Fed during this period established the 
discount rate more as an integral part of the counter-cyclical 
mechanisms the country has at its disposal.
In i960, the Fed accurately predicted an economic down­
turn by increasing open market operations in late March*
75Nearly #1.5 billion of Government securities were purchased. 
However, the three month Treasury bill rate had dropped from 
its cyclical high of 4.49^ in December, 1959, to 5.29# in 
May, i960. Member bank borrowing had dropped from #905 million 
in January to #502 million in May. As such, the discount 
rate reduction from 4# to 3 1/2# during June 5-14 was rather 
late. However, the rate decrease was instigated to closer 
align it with market rates and to reduce the cost of member 
bank borrowing from the Reserve banks. The discount rate 
adjustment was a signal of Fed's attitude, in that inflation 
was no longer considered a problem, both production and 
employment were presumed to be stimulated by the lower rate, 
and that a change toward more flexible monetary policy was
74ibia. 75lbld.. p. 90.
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being conducted as was considered necessary by the public.?^ 
After the change, the stock market jumped sharply. The reason 
for this was that investors possibly considered the increase 
the little extra insurance needed for a good business year 
to come. Member banks, however, still holding onto a 5^ 
prime rate, wanted to see their deposit— or reserve— increased 
before they endorsed a cut in lending rates.
The rational for the other discount rate reduction in 
i960 was the same as for the previous action. Three month 
Treasury bills averaged 2.30# in July and 2.13# on the week 
ending August 6. The Federal Funds rate was near 3# by August. 
Member bank borrowing decreased from #502 million in May to 
#388 million in July. As such, the discount rate was reduced 
by 1/2# to 3# during August 12-September 9. Perhaps the most 
significant reaction to come out of this action was the 
reduction of the prime rate during August 22-23 from 5# to 
4 1/2#. This discount rate manipulation can be considered 
well timed and in line with the then prevailing monetary 
ease. To complement the discount rate action. Fed open 
market operations purchased about #1 billion of Government 
securities. This action, taken during August through November, 
was to help member banks meet changing reserve needs and 
to help offset the impact of a large gold outflow without
?^"Fed Loosens Up Another Notch,” Business Week, 
(June 11, i960), p, 25.
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exerting undue downward pressure on short-term Treasury bills
which could stimulate further outflow of fbnds.^^In addition
to open market operations, the Fed authorized member banks
to count about $500^of their vault cash as required reserves,
and It authorized reduced reserve requirements on demand
deposits at central reserve city banks to be reduced to
17 1/2^ from 185̂ . This move released an additional #125
million of reserves, and was made, primarily, to aid member
78banks In meeting seasonal needs for reserve funds.'
Nearly three years passed before the Fed again used the 
discount rate mechanism. Since the United States was exper­
iencing economic prosperity and growth since August, i960, 
there were numerous pressures on the money market. However, 
these pressures were not significant enough to warrant directed 
monetary control measures other than open market operations. 
Regulation Q, though, was revised in December, I96I, to allow 
member banks to pay 3 1/2^ on savings deposits and 4^ on those 
over one year. Maximum rates on time deposits from 6 months 
to one year were raised to 3 1/2# and to 4# for those over 
one year.T^This revision allowed the member banks to compete 
more effectively for savings and time depoàits to offset for­
eign investment and to allow a monetary base to build up for 
future economic growth. Also, reserve requirements were
T^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 91. ^^Ibid. ?^Ibid.. p.92.
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adjusted on time deposits to from 5%, releasing |78o 
million In reserves. This move was made to minimize down­
ward pressure on Interest rates on short-terms and to allow 
a monetary base to build up for future economic growth. Other 
than these actions, then, the open market operations performed 
the role of monetary stabilizer, and, as such, monetary policy 
turned quite Inflexible.
During the Interim, the money market,rates were consider­
ably below the prevailing '5% discount rate. Three month 
Treasury bills averaged 2.36# monthly In 1961 and 2.77# In 
1962, and 2.92# In the first half of I963. Federal Funds 
rates varied from a high of 2.89# to a low of 1.35# during 
1961 and 1962. Member bank borrowing from Reserve banks 
averaged #79.5 million monthly In 1961, #78.7 million In 
1962, and #153.3 million during the first half of I963. 
Although the scene was set for a discount rate Increase to 
bring it Into closer alignment with short-term rates of In­
terest and to stimulate member bank borrowing, this was not 
done. As a result, with the low yields received on short­
term securities of American Issue, an Influx of foreign short­
term Investment was prevalent during the Interim.period.
The United States had witnessed, during the past five 
years, a persistent build-up of Its short-term liabilities 
to foreigners, nearly #17 billion. This balance of payments 
deficit occured even after the payment of #18 billion In gold 
In consequence of the perenlal deficit In United States
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International payments accounts. In 1963, that defioit still
persisted and not reducing substantially. In the first six
months of I960, it reached an annual rate of #3.5 billion,
80excluding government transactions. Outflows of short-term 
capital had been contributing materially to the I963 deficit.
As such, the Kennedy Administration planned an intensive 
attack on the balance of payments deficit. The first maneuver 
was to use monetary policy to reduce the outflow of short­
term funds from the United States. The second part of the 
assault was designed to reduce defense spending overseas, to 
demand greater insistence on lowering European trade barriers 
against the United States, and to renew the drive for tax 
cuts to improve the competitive position of United States 
industry and to attract foreign capital.®^
The Fed, in its part of the battle, wanted to use a mech­
anism which would signal its determination to do something 
about the present capital outflow. As such, the discount 
rate was to be increased by 1/2#. Although there was a possib­
ility for the discount rate to push long-term rates up, the 
administration viewed that this wouldn't happen. The rational 
used was that because the supply of funds available through
80Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLIX (August, 1963), p. IO63.
®^"Stage Set for Boost in Fed Discount Rate," Business 
Week. (July 13, 1963), p. 112.
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long-term Investments couldn't be pushed up, or so It was 
believed, because of the strong economy, and the belief that 
the use of monetary policy for balance of payment reasons
Q Owouldn't slow the economy down. The goal was also to increase 
the discount rate without increasing the prime rate, which 
had been at 4 1/2# since August, I960, the last discount rate 
change•
The discount rate increase which followed was one of 
the few which wasn't directed solely and directly for align­
ment with market interest rates. The discount rat^ then, 
rose from 3# to 3 1/2# during July 17-26, Three month Treasury 
bills were 3.22# on the week ending July 13, and they climbed 
steadily for the remainder of the year meeting the new discount 
rate by November. In conjunction with the discount rate move, 
the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation Q by increasing 
to 4#, effective July 17, 1963, the maximum rate of interest 
member banks were permitted to pay on time deposits and cert-
Q ?
ificates with maturities of 90 days to one year. The combined 
monetary action, then, was to help reduce short-term capital 
outflows by firming United States short-term money market rates 
and to permit member banks to compete more effectively fôr 
funds, both foreign and domestic, available for investment.
Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLIX (July, 1963), p. 946.
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This action, aimed at helping cease a potential drain on 
United States monetary reserves associated with persistent 
deficit in balance of payments, did not constitute a major 
change in Fed policy. It was a directed use of monetary 
control mechanisms for a specific purpose.
Congruent open market operations also were directed to­
ward reducing the outflow of capital. Between the middle of 
May and December, Fed open market operations purchased nearly
Oh
#2.3 billion of United States Government securities. This, 
in turn, produced tightness in the money market which was to 
minimize the outflow of capital to foreign nations.
A combined discount rate increase and a revision of 
Regulation Q was action taken by the Federal Reserve Board 
to maintain the international strength of the dollar in 
November, 1964. The discount rate was increased to M-% during 
November 24-30. In addition, Regulation Q, revisions allowed 
member banks to pay 4 l/2# from 4^ on time deposits over 90 
days and to pay 4^ from 3 l/2^ on savings deposits held less 
than one year and from 1% to 4^ for maturities of 30 to 89 
days.^^The discount rate increase came in response to England's 
rise November 23 of its bank rates from 5% to 7% to stop a 
massive "bear" raid against the pound.According to
^^Eastburn, op. cit.. pp. 94-95.
New Touch of Caution," Business Week. (November 28,
1964), p. 27.
86Ibid.
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Chairman Martin of the Board of Governors, the Fed action 
was an ’’insurance policy” against any outflows of funds from 
the United States which might result from Britain’s move.^^ 
The rational behind the duel actions was to counter possible 
capital outflows that might have been prompted by any widen­
ing spread between United States interest rates and foreign
interest rates and to ensure the flow of savings to member
88banks for domestic investment finance.
Open market operations were also used for this purpose. 
In late November to December, the Fed purchased about |750 
million of Government securities to ensure that the rise in 
money market rates following discount rate actions would not 
restrict the availability of domestic credit.
The November discount rate action produced generally 
critical reactions.^^Some financial and economic circles 
believed that the British dilemma was just an excuse for the 
Fed to do what it was planning on anyway. Although the 
majority of the governors of the Federal Reserve had urged 
for stronger policy. Chairman Martin insisted that the move 
was taken only for international reasons. Some experts 
predicted an increase in the prime rate. This never happened,
Q'̂ Ibld.
Federal Reserve Bulletin. L (December, 1964), p. 1520. 
^^Eastburn, on. cit.. p. 96.
New Touch of Caution,” op. cit.. pp. 27-28.
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John Kenneth Galbraith charged that the Fed had yielded to 
those who wanted higher interest rates; to please them and 
not to benefit those who never had money to lend. Other 
economists saw a slackening of United States growth rate 
during the middle of 1965 and felt that the discount rate 
increase would lead to generally tighter money. However, the 
Fed tried to promote the idea that the discount rate didn't 
necessarily mean tighter money. It characterized the prevail­
ing monetary policy as "cautious, less easy'*, but one "essen - 
tially of ease", the implication being that if the British 
bank rate increase turned the sterling crisis favorable to 
that country, the discount rate would drop.^^
One of the most controversial of the Fed's adjustment of 
the discount rate occurred in December, 1965. The economy was 
nearing its fifty-seventh month of expansion and showing signs 
of inflationary pressures. Three month Treasury bill yields 
were 4.08^ in November and 4.12^ on the week ending December 
4. Federal Funds varied around the discount rate since 
July, 1965, and were 4.10^ in November, 1965. Certificates 
of Deposit rates, first offered in May of I962 at 2.94^, had 
increased to 4.47^ in November, I965. The time was right 
for an increase in the discount rate. Prior to the discount 
rate increase in December, the Johnson Administration and
91Ibid.
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and economic and financial sectors desired it to prevent 
"a deteriation in the quality of credit'.', brought about by 
intense bank competition for high volume at extraordinarily 
small profit margins.
Considering the inflationary pressures on the economy, 
Chairman Martin pressed for a discount rate increase on the 
theory that the most effective time to combat inflation is 
during the development stage. As such, the discount rate 
was increased during December 6-13 to 4 \/2% from 4%, highest 
in 35 years. The increase was intended to "moderate additional 
bank reliance on short-term borrowings from the Federal 
Reserve to meet intensifying loan demands."^^The action pro­
vided additional reserves to member banks to meet seasonal 
pressures as well as the then expanding credit needs without 
promoting excesses, primarily through the purchase of Govern­
ment securities on the open market.^^During the December- 
January transition period, open market operations aided the 
reserve positions of member banks through open market purchases 
aimed at softening the shock of the discount rate move.
In connection with the discount rate increase, the Fed 
revised regulation Q on December 6. The revision permitted
^ Michael E. Lev)", "Increase in the Discount Rate; Timing, 
Motivation, Economic Effects," Conference Board Record. Ill 
(January, 1966), p. 14.
93ibld.
^ 'Discount Hike Starts to Pinch Bank Loans," Business 
Week. (February 5, 1966), p. 26.
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member banks to pay 5 l/2% on time deposits over 30 days,
on 30 to 89 day time deposits and Certificates of Deposits, 
and 4 1/2% on 90 days and over on time deposits and Certificates 
of Deposits. The intention of the revision was to attract 
and retain deposits and to make effective use of savings 
funds already available in the economy to finance their loan
expansion.95
The combined action of the discount rate increase and the 
Regulation Q revision was hoped to have a three-pronged impact. 
First, it was to help prevent inflationary excesses in develop­
ing in an economy carrying the added expense of the Viet Nam 
war. Secondly, it was to aid the Government's program to 
overcome a persistent deficit in the United States balance of 
payments, running at an annual rate of #1.85 billion,during the 
first three quarters of 1965. Thirdly, it was to again demon­
strate the determination to maintain the international strength 
of the dollar.9G
The Federal Reserve Board's action on the discount rate 
was heavily criticized. The move was considered an "open 
declaration of independence by the Federal Reserve Board 
against the Administration"9^ince the discount rate was
95"Federal Reserve Policy Actions," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, LI (December, I965), p. I667.
9^Ibid., pp. I668-I676.
97Levy, pp. cit., p. 14.
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adjusted without the Administration’s knowledge. Since the 
Administration was against higher interest rates, the Fed 
wasn't expected to move without express Administration auth­
ority. It was felt by many experts that the discount rate 
wouldn't be raised until after the President's budget message 
in January, I966. However, Chairman Martin felt that with 
a vacancy in the Board coming up in January, the liklihood 
of making any future restraint would be more difficult with 
a nomination which would change the balance of power of the 
Board. As it was, the rate change was approved by a 4-3 vote, 
with Governor Baderston, whose term was expiring January 31, 
voting with the majority.^^Also, if the Board waited until 
mid-January to change the discount rate, no time for favorable 
Fed action would be due to the budget announcement. An out­
come of the discount rate, which enraged some experts, was the 
increase of the prime rate. The move was conducted December 
6 raising the prime rate to 5% from 4 1/2% set in August, i960, 
and originated with the First National Bank of Chicago.^9
Investment men were worried by, the discount rate increase 
since, historically, a rise leads to a peak in the stock 
market.^^As such, the stock market registered the highest 
opening volume since 1929 and hasn't recovered fully since.
9 Ibid.
99"Taklng Rise in Stride," Business Week. (December 11, 
1965).,,p. 25.
l00"Feij Holds Key To Action," Business Week. (December 11,
1965), p. 141.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
The importance of the discount rate as a counter-cyclical 
weapon has varied since the passage of the Federal Reserve 
Act* The rise of the open market operation as a monetary 
tool for stabilizing a prevailing policy has minimized the 
use of discount rates. Although the discount window was used 
somewhat during the 1920's, it was little used from 1934 through 
1952. During most of the 1930's, member banks never readily 
used the discount window due to the large excesses of reserves. 
Thus, the mechanism had a standby significance. During World 
War II, and until early 1951, member banks found it more 
advantageous to dispose of United States Government securities 
for replenishment of reserves rather than to utilize the dis­
count window. These securities, of which member banks had 
large amounts due to Federal Reserve financial committment 
of the war, were supported by the Fed. After the Treasury- 
Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, the support policy was dis­
continued leaving the securities in the hands of supply and 
demand forces.
It was not until after the Accord that the discount rate 
assumed real importance. Since the Accord removed Fed support 
of Government securities, yields were free to rise. Thus, 
when yields rose above the discount rate, the discount window
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became an attractive source of reserve funds because of the 
lower cost to the member bank. The time was right for the 
use of the discount rate as an integral part of counter­
cyclical monetary policy, but no need arose for it. When the 
Fed did turn to discount policy, it caused a reluctance for 
member banks to borrow with discount rate increases which 
goes along with an ingrained attitude against going into debt. 
As such, the member banks sold open-market assets and tightened 
loan policy to avoid borrowing from the Reserve banks, as in
1954. When the Fed forced member banks to borrow in 1953 and
1955, the only effect it had was to cause uncertainty as to 
the use of the mechanism and as to the effect on the business 
community.
After the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation A of 
the Federal Reserve Act in 1955, the importance of the discount 
rate as a counter-cyclical mechanism was re-established. Al­
though the revision more-or-less Just restated the original 
Regulation, the implication was that the Fed condoned and 
promoted the use of the discount window by member banks to 
meet reserve stringencies, its prime purpose. It reasserted 
that the use of the discount window was a privilege, not a 
right, of Federal Reserve System membership.
The Federal Reserve Board's rational behind discount 
rate changes has been varied. The majority of the discount 
rate changes were; (1) to align the discount rate closer to
78
short-term market rates of interest, three month Treasury bills 
in particular, and (2) to eliminate the discount rate as a 
deterrent to member bank borrowing by lowering it or to 
make borrowing more expensive by raising it. Discount rate 
changes tend to lag behind these market rates. Market rates 
could be undergoing a transition period and would, thus, be 
expected to fall, as they did in late 1959 and early I960.
Here market rates were above the 4^ discount rate for four 
months. The Fed allowed the rates to ride themselves out 
since the economy was at a cyclical plateau. The discount 
rate actually becomes the anchor around which other rates 
generally float. This is an important consideration when the 
Fed changes it.
The first use of the discount rate as a signal of mone­
tary policy was during 1956. The signal aspect of the dis­
count rate is the major significance of it. As such, with 
the raising of the discount rate, the Fed signals to the 
public, business community, and financial and economic inter­
ests the credit policy which will be either tightening or 
will soon be tightened. And, with the lowering of the dis­
count.rate, greater ease is likely to be the policy. There­
fore, since member banlcs had resorted to borrowing on a scale 
large enough to allow the discount rate to be influential as 
a counter-cyclical tool, the Fed used the 1956 discount rate 
increases to signal a tightening monetary and credit policy.
19
Although the Fed has adjusted the discount rate to he 
consistent with the economic and monetary conditions of the 
time, there have been instances of untiraelyness. in 1957, 
three month Treasury bills as well as other other short­
term rates were averaging above the prevailing 3.0^ discount 
rate for eight.months. Just after the discount rate adjust­
ment, the economy had a down-turn which could be partially 
to blame on the Fed since it hadn’t acted when it should have, 
thus causing superfluous ideas about the economy. However, 
the discount rate adjustments during 1958, 1959, and i960 
could be considered timely and routine, aligning it with 
short-term market rates and signalling a restrictive or easy 
monetary and credit policy.
The discount rate changes in the 1960’s expansion were 
directed toward international considerations. Here, rate 
adjustments were keeping the rate in line with short-term 
market rates so as to aid in retaining capital in the United 
States by tightening the short-term market. As such, it was 
used to better the balance of payments position and to uphold 
the international strength of the dollar.
The real role of the discount rate is to signal a change 
in credit policy so that open market operations and reserve 
requirement adjustments can affect the reserve position of 
member banks, more heavily. As such, the actual change in 
the credit conditions is due to the open market operations.
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With each discount rate change, open market operations are 
conducted to supplement the move. Ifhen the discount rate is 
increased to tighten the money market, open market operations 
sell Government securities, thus sopping up excess reserves.
Open market operations purchase securities when the discount 
rate is reduced to aid in the easing monetary policy.
At times, reserve requirements are adjusted as a supple­
mentary action to discount rate changes. In I963, in order to 
more effectively combat a balance of payments deficit result­
ing from the movement of short-term capital from this country, 
reserve requirements were lowered in conjunction with a discount 
rate increase. The move further supported the discount rate's 
purpose and allowed member banks to compete more effectively 
for domestic and foreign funds.
The Federal Reserve Board's use of the discount rate, 
then, is primarily that of a signal of intentions in regard 
to the monetary and credit policy the Board has at its dis­
posal, The discount rate's role is largely psychological, 
using open-market operations as a back-up. The rationale 
behind a Federal Reserve discount rate change is dependent 
upon general and specific economic and financial conditions, 
but is mainly used as an anchor rate around which short-term 
market interest rates usually float.
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